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Abstract Ready or not, the digitalization of information has
come and privacy is standing out there, possibly at stake.
Although digital privacy is an identified priority in our soci-
ety, few systematic, effective methodologies exist that deal
with privacy threats thoroughly. This paper presents a com-
prehensive framework to model privacy threats in software-
based systems. First, this work provides a systematic meth-
odology to model privacy-specific threats. Analogous to
STRIDE, an information flow oriented model of the system
is leveraged to guide the analysis and to provide broad cov-
erage. The methodology instructs the analyst on what issues
should be investigated, and where in the model those issues
could emerge. This is achieved by (i) defining a list of pri-
vacy threat types and (ii) providing the mappings between
threat types and the elements in the system model. Second,
this work provides an extensive catalogue of privacy-specific
threat tree patterns that can be used to detail the threat anal-
ysis outlined above. Finally, this work provides the means
to map the existing privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)
to the identified privacy threats. Therefore, the selection of
sound privacy countermeasures is simplified.
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1 Introduction
Privacy becomes increasingly important in the current so-
ciety. Most of the information is now digitalized to facili-
tate quick and easy access. It is thus extremely important
that digital privacy is sufficiently protected to prevent per-
sonal information from being revealed to unauthorized sub-
jects. A stepping stone of security and privacy analysis is
threat modeling, i.e., the “black hat” activity of looking into
what can possibly go wrong in a system. Threats are cru-
cial to the definition of the requirements and play a key role
in the selection of the countermeasures. Unfortunately, the
state of the art lacks systematic approaches to model privacy
threats, elicit privacy requirements, and instantiate privacy-
enhancing countermeasures, accordingly. Indeed, there is an
asymmetry for privacy with respect to security concerns.
These latter have a far better support in terms of method-
ological approaches to threat modeling. For instance, in the
goal-oriented requirements space, KAOS [1] provides a meth-
odology to systematically analyze a system’s anti-goals (and
the corresponding refined threats) and therefore derive secu-
rity requirements [2]. The same holds in the area of scenario-
based techniques. For instance, Microsoft’s STRIDE is an
industrial-level methodology to eliciting threat scenarios and,
therefore, deriving security use cases [3]. Notably, a sig-
nificantly sized body of reusable knowledge is also avail-
able in the secure software engineering community. Secu-
rity knowledge is often packaged in the shape of checklists
and patterns. For instance, STRIDE comes bundled with a
catalogue of security threat tree patterns that can be read-
ily instantiated in the system at hand so to elicit a close-to-
exhaustive set of potential security threats. Methodologies
and knowledge are two important pillars for software se-
curity and privacy, including requirements engineering [4].
Surprisingly, privacy is still lagging behind. For instance,
STRIDE does not cover privacy threats.
This paper contributes to the aforementioned dimensions,
in terms of methodology and knowledge, by providing a
comprehensive privacy threat modeling framework. A high-
level overview of this work is sketched out in Section 3.
First, this work provides a systematic methodology to
model privacy-specific threats. Analogous to STRIDE, an
information flow oriented model of the system is leveraged
to guide the analysis and to provide broad coverage. The
data flow diagram (DFD) notation has been selected and,
for reference, it is described in Section 2. The methodology
instructs the analyst on what issues should be investigated
and where in the model those issues could emerge. This is
achieved by defining a list of privacy threat types and by
providing the mapping between the threat types and the el-
ements in the system model. This part of the methodology
is described in Section 5. Note that the privacy threat types
2have been identified in contrast with well known privacy ob-
jectives, which are summarized in Section 4.
Second, this work provides an extensive catalogue of
privacy-specific threat tree patterns that can be used to de-
tail the threat analysis outlined above. In a nutshell, they re-
fine the privacy threat types by providing concrete examples.
The catalogue is described in Section 6, while Section 7 il-
lustrates how to instantiate the threat tree patterns in order
to elicit the misuse cases.
An additional contribution of this paper refers to the soft-
ware engineering phase. This work provides the means to
map the existing privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) to
the identified privacy threats, which simplifies the selection
of sound privacy countermeasures. This is described in Sec-
tion 8.
Concerning the rest of the paper, the related work is pre-
sented in Section 9, a discussion of the proposed methodol-
ogy is presented in Section 10 and the concluding remarks
are given in Section 11.
2 Background: security threat modeling using STRIDE
Security, in contrast to privacy, has already been well in-
tegrated in the Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL) [3],
which is a well-established methodology. To build a secure
software system, an important aspect is to consider how an
attacker might compromise the system by exploiting design
flaws and building the necessary defense mechanisms in the
system. In this respect, threat modeling plays the key role,
and SDL has integrated a systematic approach for security
threat modeling using STRIDE. In this section, we will briefly
review the STRIDE threat modeling process, which consists
of nine high-level steps.
Step 1: Define use scenarios. System designers need to
determine which key functionality is within the scope.
Step 2: Gather a list of external dependencies. Each ap-
plication depends on the operating system it runs on, the
database it uses, and so on; these dependencies need to be
defined.
Step 3: Define security assumptions. In the analysis phase,
decisions are often based on implicit assumptions. There-
fore, it is important to note down all the assumptions, to un-
derstand the entire system comprehensively.
Step 4: Create external security notes. Because each ex-
ternal dependency can have its implication on security, it is
useful to list all the restrictions and implications introduced
by the external security notes. An example of such a security
note is to specify which ports are open for database access
or HTTP traffic.
Step 5: Create one or more DFDs of the application be-
ing analyzed. The software-based system being analyzed is
decomposed in relevant (either logical or structural) compo-
nents, and for each of these parts the corresponding threats
are analyzed. This process is repeated over an increasingly
refined model until a level is reached where the residual
threats are acceptable.
The system is graphically represented using a data flow
diagram (DFD), with the following elements: data flows (i.e.
communication data), data stores (i.e. logical data or con-
crete databases, files, and so on), processes (i.e. units of
functionality or programs) and external entities (i.e. end-
points of the system like users, external services, and so on).
For threat modeling, trust boundaries are also introduced to
indicate the border between trustworthy and untrustworthy
elements.
An example DFD is shown in Figure 1 to illustrate a
use case application (Social Network 2.0) that will be dis-
cussed throughout this paper. This Social Network 2.0 ap-
plication is an abstract representation of a social network,
where online users share personal information such as re-
lationship status, pictures, and comments with their friends.
In the DFD, the user is represented as an entity to interact
with the system. The Social Network 2.0 application con-
tains two processes (the portal and the service) and one data
store containing all the personal information of the users.
The trust boundary shows that the processes, the data store,
and the communication (data flows)between the two are as-
sumed to be trustworthy in this particular setting.
Fig. 1 The Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of the Social Network 2.0 ap-
plication
Step 6: Determine threat types. The STRIDE threat tax-
onomy is used to identify security threat types. STRIDE is
an acronym for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Informa-
tion disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege.
These threats are the negation of the main security proper-
ties, namely confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenti-
cation, authorization and non-repudiation.
Step 7: Identify the threats to the system. Each element
of the data flow diagram is assigned to a set of susceptible
threats. Table 1 gives an overview of the different DFD ele-
ments with the corresponding security threats they are sub-
ject to (marked with ).
3Table 1 Security concerns with corresponding security threats and
DFD elements susceptible to threats (DF-Data flow, DS-Data store,
P-Process, E-External entity), proposed by the Security Development
Lifecycle (SDL) [3].
Security property Security threat DF DS P E
Authentication Spoofing  
Integrity Tampering   
Non-repudiation Repudiation   
Confidentiality Information Disclosure   
Availability Denial of Service   
Authorization Elevation of Privilege 
To identify which threats are applicable to a specific sys-
tem, threat tree patterns can be used. For each valid inter-
section in Table 1, a threat tree pattern suggests the possible
security-related preconditions for the STRIDE category, in
order to help analysts determine the relevance of a threat
for the system. An example threat tree is presented in Fig-
ure 2. Each path of the threat tree indicates a valid attack
path. Note that some trees cascade. For example, the tree in
Figure 2 shows the conditions that could lead to tampering
threats against a process. The node indicated as a circle (or
oval) in the threat tree means a root threat. These are the
main STRIDE threats which, indirectly, can lead to another
root threat, e.g. someone can indirectly tamper with a pro-
cess by spoofing an external entity. The node indicated as
a rectangle suggest a concrete threat in an attack path. The
arrows connecting the nodes in general refer to a OR rela-
tion among the various preconditions, unless it is indicated
explicitly with “AND” to refer to a AND relation.
Afterwards, the identified privacy threats need to be doc-
umented as misuse cases, i.e., as a collection of threat sce-
narios in the system.
Fig. 2 Example security threat tree pattern of tampering a process [3]
Step 8: Determine risk. For each threat, the appropriate
security risk level has to be determined, which can be used
to define the priorities of the threats to be resolved.
Step 9: Plan mitigation. In the final step of the methodol-
ogy, the risk of the threat is reduced or eliminated by intro-
ducing proper countermeasures and defenses. Mitigating a
risk to the threat corresponds to eliminating one attack path
in the threat tree. An overview of some possible mitigation
technologies linked to each security property is provided.
These steps are security-related and should be enhanced
by the corresponding privacy perspective in order to perform
a privacy threat analysis. In particular, privacy assumptions
need to be specified in step 3 and external privacy notes are
considered in step 4. This paper proposes privacy-specific
extensions to the key steps: determining privacy threat types
(step 6) in Section 5.1 and identifying privacy threats (step
7) in Sections 5.2 to 7. The mitigation of privacy threats via
privacy enhancing solutions (step 9) is discussed in Section
8.
2.1 Security Threat Modeling Techniques
STRIDE comes with the main advantage of an extensive,
reusable knowledge base (i.e. the threat tree patterns). How-
ever, some alternatives to elicit security threats exist.
Attack trees are similar to fault trees [5]. The root node
describes the high-level attack which is further decomposed
in lower-level attack branches. Each node represents a step
that must be successfully executed in order to complete the
attack represented by the parent node. Nodes can be com-
posed in conjunctions and disjunctions. Attack trees can have
both a graphical and a textual representation.
Misuse cases [6] or abuse cases are similar to regular use
cases, however with a focus on the attacker’s actions. Mis-
use cases have a textual representation, similar to use cases,
and can also be represented in a misuse case diagram, which
summarizes all existing misuse cases for a certain system
and their impact on the system’s use cases. Both techniques
can be used to elicit security threats; these techniques how-
ever do not provide methodological guidance to discover ad-
ditional threats. Opdahl and Sindre [7] have made an exper-
imental comparison between attack trees and misuse cases
of which the main finding was that attack trees are more ef-
fective for finding threats. Attack trees encourage the use of
standard textbook threats and decomposition in lower-level
threats. Misuse case analysis focuses more on user-level and
organizational threats.
KAOS [1], a goal-oriented requirements analysis frame-
work, has been extended with anti-goals to support the mod-
eling of threats. Such anti-goals express the goals of an at-
tacker who tries to abuse the system. Although no actual
methodology exists to determine the threats, the root anti-
goals are created by negating all the positive system goals.
4Next, the anti-goals are refined into trees. The formal nature
of KAOS is an advantage which makes it possible to deter-
mine completeness of the (anti-)goals.
3 Our approach – the LINDDUN methodology
In this work, we propose a systemic approach for privacy
threat modeling – the LINDDUNmethodology – to elicit the
privacy requirements of software-intensive systems and se-
lect privacy enhancing technologies accordingly. Each letter
of “LINDDUN” stands for a privacy threat type obtained by
negating a privacy property. Privacy properties and threats
types are briefly described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Figure 3 depicts the building blocks of LINDDUN. In
the figure, a distinction is marked between the proposed meth-
odology and the supporting knowledge provided to assist
each step. First of all, a data flow diagram is created based on
the high-level system description. This is followed by map-
ping privacy threats to the DFD elements using Table 4 as a
guide to determine the corresponding threats. In particular, a
number of privacy tree patterns from Section 6 will be pro-
posed to detail the privacy threat instances in a designated
system, by providing an overview of the most common pre-
conditions of each threat. Next, the identified privacy threats
that are relevant to the designated system are documented as
misuse cases (cf. Section 7). A misuse case presents a col-
lection of threat scenarios in the system.
The identified privacy threats that needs to be evaluated
and prioritized via risk assessment. Indeed, due to both time
and budget constraints, not all threats are worthy further
treatment. Note that details on the risk-analysis process are
beyond the scope of this work.
The last two steps comprise so-called “white hat” ac-
tivities. The privacy requirements of the system are elicited
from the misuse cases following the mapping in Table 6. Fi-
nally, appropriate privacy enhancing solutions are selected
according to the privacy requirements. Table 7 provides an
overview of the state-of-art privacy enhancing techniques
and the mapping to their corresponding privacy objectives.
The fact that the LINDDUN framework and STRIDE
are based on similar approaches creates synergy. Therefore,
the privacy and security analysis can be closely integrated
into the SDL. Nevertheless, the aforementioned LINDDUN
framework for privacy can be performed independently.
4 Privacy properties
It is not the intention to propose a new taxonomy of privacy
definitions in this paper. However, it is crucial to have the
right basis for the proposed LINDDUN framework, there-
fore definitions of privacy properties are elaborately studied
and reviewed in this section. The literature is rich of studies
Fig. 3 The LINDDUN methodology and the required system-specific
knowledge
to conceptualize privacy, and we refer interested readers to
the work by Solove [8,9] for a comprehensive understanding
of privacy. Most privacy properties in the LINDDUN frame-
work comply with the terminology proposed by Pfitzmann
et al. [10], as is widely recognized in the privacy research
community.
4.1 Understanding privacy: hard privacy vs. soft privacy
As an abstract and subjective concept, the definition of pri-
vacy varies depending on social and cultural issues, study
disciplines, stakeholder interests, and application context.
Popular privacy definitions include “the right to be let alone”,
focusing on freedom from intrusion, and “the right to infor-
mational self-determination”, allowing individuals to “con-
trol, edit, manage, and delete information about themselves
and decide when, how and to what extent that information is
communicated to others” [11].
Privacy can be distinguished as hard privacy and soft
privacy, as proposed by Danezis [12]. The data protection
goal of hard privacy refers to data minimization, based on
the assumption that personal data is not divulged to third
parties. The system model of hard privacy is that a data sub-
ject (as a security user) provides as little data as possible and
tries to reduce the need to “trust” other entities. The threat
model includes service provider, data holder, and adversar-
ial environment, where strategic adversaries with certain re-
sources are motivated to breach privacy, similar to security
systems. Soft privacy, on the contrary, is based on the as-
sumption that data subject lost control of personal data and
has to trust the honesty and competence of data controllers.
The data protection goal of soft privacy is to provide data
security and process data with specific purpose and consent,
by means of policies, access control, and audit. The system
model is that the data subject provides personal data and the
data controller (as a security user) is responsible for the data
5protection. Consequently, a weaker threat model applies, in-
cluding different parties with inequality of power, such as
external parties, honest insiders who make errors, and cor-
rupt insiders within honest data holders. An overview of
hard and soft privacy solutions will be given in Section 8.
Besides conceptualizing privacy, another research chal-
lenge is to define privacy properties in software based sys-
tems. Some classical security properties are desired for build-
ing in privacy, including confidentiality (ensuring that infor-
mation is accessible only by authorized parties), integrity
(safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of informa-
tion and processing methods), availability (or censorship
resistance, ensuring information is accessible to authorized
users), and non repudiation (ensuring one not be able to
deny what one has done). The definitions of these proper-
ties can be found in ISO 17799 [13].
In addition, a number of properties are also appreciated,
including anonymity (hiding links between identity and ac-
tion or a piece of information), unlinkability (hiding link be-
tween two or more actions, identities and pieces of infor-
mation), undetectability (or covertness) and unobservabil-
ity (hiding user’s activity), plausible deniability (opposite as
non-repudiation, no others can prove one has said or done
something), and forward security (also referred as forward
secrecy and freedom from compulsion, meaning that once
the communication is securely over, it cannot be decrypted
any more).
We decided to include the following privacy properties
in the proposed framework, namely unlinkability, anonym-
ity and pseudonymity, plausible deniability, undetectability
and unobservability, and confidentiality (hiding data con-
tent, including access control) as hard privacy properties;
user content awareness (including feedback for user privacy
awareness, data update and expire) together with policy and
consent compliance as soft privacy properties. These proper-
ties are described in the following sections. Note that prop-
erties such as integrity, availability, and forward security are
also important for privacy. However, we consider them as
typical security properties; hence they are to be considered
in the security engineering framework, such as STRIDE.
4.2 Unlinkability
The unlinkability property refers to hiding the link between
two or more actions, identities, and pieces of information.
Examples of unlinkability include hiding links between two
anonymous messages sent by the same person, two web page
visits by the same user, entries in two databases related to the
same person, or two people related by a friendship link in a
social network.
Unlinkability is defined Pfitzmann et al. as [10]: “Un-
linkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., sub-
jects, messages, actions, ...) from an attackers perspective
means that within the system (comprising these and possi-
bly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish
whether these IOIs are related or not.” Although it is not
explicitly mentioned, the definition of unlinkability implies
that the two or more IOIs are of the comparable types, oth-
erwise it is infeasible to make the comparison.
4.3 Anonymity
Essentially, the anonymity property refers to hiding the link
between an identity and an action or a piece of information.
Examples are anonymous sender of an email, writer of a
text, person accessing a service, person to whom an entry
in a database relates, and so on.
Anonymity is defined as [10]: “Anonymity of a subject
from an attackers perspective means that the attacker cannot
sufficiently identify the subject within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set.” Anonymity can also be described in terms
of unlinkability. If one considers sending and receiving of
messages as attributes; the items of interest (IOIs) are who
has sent or received which message. Then, “anonymity of a
subject with respect to an attribute may be defined as un-
linkability of this subject and this attribute.” For instance,
sender anonymity of a subject means that to this potentially
sending subject, each message is unlinkable.
4.4 Pseudonymity
The pseudonymity property suggests that it is possible to
build a reputation on a pseudonym and possible to use mul-
tiple pseudonyms for different purposes. Examples include
a person publishes comments on social network sites un-
der different pseudonyms and a person uses a pseudonym to
subscribe to a service.
Pfitzmann et al. [10] defines pseudonymity as: “A pseu-
donym is an identifier of a subject other than one of the sub-
jects real names. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms
as identifiers. A subject is pseudonymous if a pseudonym is
used as identifier instead of one of its real names.” Pseu-
donymity can also be perceived with respect to linkability.
Whereas anonymity and identifiability (or accountability)
are the extremes with respect to linkability to subjects, pseu-
donymity is the entire field between and including these ex-
tremes. Thus, pseudonymity comprises all degrees of linka-
bility to a subject.
4.5 Plausible deniability
For privacy, plausible deniability refers to the ability to deny
having performed an action that other parties can neither
6confirm nor contradict. Plausible deniability from an attack-
ers perspective means that an attacker cannot prove a user
knows, has done or has said something. Sometimes, depend-
ing on the application, plausible deniability is desirable over
non-repudiation, for instance, in an application used by whis-
tleblowers, users will want to deny ever sent a certain mes-
sage to protect their safety. Other examples include off-the-
record conversations, possibility to deny the existence of an
encrypted file, deny that a file is transmitted from a data
source, or deny that a database record belongs to a person.
The relation between non-repudiation and plausible de-
niability is according to Roe in [14]: “The goal of the non-
repudiation service is to provide irrefutable evidence con-
cerning the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or ac-
tion. If we believe that there is a need for this as a security
service[...] we must also concede that some participants de-
sire the opposite effect: that there be no irrefutable evidence
concerning a disputed event or action.” This “complemen-
tary service” is plausible deniability. In particular, it ensures
that “an instance of communication between computer sys-
tems leaves behind no unequivocal evidence of its having
taken place. Features of communications protocols that were
seen as defects from the standpoint of non-repudiation can
be seen as benefits from the standpoint of this converse prob-
lem, which is called plausible deniability.”
4.6 Undetectability and unobservability
The undetectability and unobservability properties refer to
hiding the user’s activities. Practical examples include, it is
impossible to know whether an entry in a database corre-
sponds to a real person, or to distinguish whether someone
or no one is in a given location.
Undetectability is defined as [10]: “Undetectability of an
item of interest (IOI) from an attackers perspective means
that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it
exists or not. If we consider messages as IOIs, this means
that messages are not sufficiently discernible from, e.g., ran-
dom noise.” For anonymity and unlinkability, not the IOI,
but only its relationship to the subject or other IOIs is pro-
tected. For undetectability, the IOIs are protected as such.
Undetectability by uninvolved subjects together with an-
onymity even if IOIs can be detected is defined as unobserv-
ability [10]: “Unobservability of an item of interest (IOI)
means undetectability of the IOI against all subjects un-
involved in it and anonymity of the subject(s) involved in
the IOI even against the other subject(s) involved in that
IOI.” The definition suggests that unobservability is unde-
tectability by uninvolved subjects AND anonymity even if
IOIs can be detected. Consequently, unobservability implies
anonymity, and unobservability implies undetectability. It
means, with respect to the same attacker, unobservability re-
veals always only a subset of the information anonymity re-
veals. Later sections of this paper will focus on undetectabil-
ity, since unobservability is in fact a combination of unde-
tectability and anonymity.
4.7 Confidentiality
The confidentiality property refers to hiding the data con-
tent or controlled release of data content. Examples include
transferring encrypted email, applying access control to a
classified document or a database containing sensitive infor-
mation.
NIST[15] describes confidentiality as following: Confi-
dentiality means preserving authorized restrictions on infor-
mation access and disclosure, including means for protect-
ing personal privacy and proprietary information. Although
confidentiality is a security property, as the definition above
states, it is also important for preserving privacy properties,
such as anonymity and unlinkability. Therefore, confiden-
tiality is also considered an important privacy property.
4.8 Content awareness
Unlike the aforesaid classical privacy properties, to our knowl-
edge, the following two properties, namely content aware-
ness, and policy and consent compliance, are not explicitly
defined in the literature. However, we consider them im-
portant privacy objectives, due to their significance to pri-
vacy and data protection. With the emerging of Web 2.0
technologies, users tend to provide excessive information
to service providers and lose control of their personal in-
formation. Therefore, the content awareness property is pro-
posed to make sure that users are aware of their personal data
and that only the minimum necessary information should be
sought and used to allow for the performance of the function
to which it relates.
The more personal identifiable information a data sub-
ject discloses, the higher the risk is for privacy violation. To
ensure content awareness, a number of technical enforce-
ment tools have been developed. For instance, the concept of
personal information feedback tools has been promoted [16,
17] to help users gain privacy awareness and self-determine
which personal data to disclose.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [18]
has been designed to allow websites (as data controllers)
to declare their intended use of the information that they
collected about the browsing users (as data subjects). P3P
addresses the content awareness property by making users
aware of how personal data are processed by the data con-
troller.
Although not necessarily privacy-oriented, another re-
sponsibility of the user, within the realm of content aware-
ness objective, is to keep user’s data up-to-date to prevent
7wrong decisions based on incorrect data. This means that the
data subject or the data controller (depends on applications)
is responsible for deleting and updating inaccurate informa-
tion. For example, it is crucial to maintain patient’s data in
e-health applications. Imagine a doctor forgetting to men-
tion that the patient is a diabetic, the absence of information
could cause fatal consequences for patients taking medica-
tion without considering negative side effects on diabetics.
To summarize, the content awareness property focuses
on the user’s consciousness regarding his own data. The user
needs to be aware of the consequences of sharing informa-
tion. These consequences can refer to the user’s privacy,
which can be violated by sharing too much personal iden-
tifiable information, as well as to undesirable results by pro-
viding incomplete or incorrect information.
4.9 Policy and consent compliance
Unlike the content awareness property focused on the user,
the policy and consent compliance property requires the
whole system – including data flows, data stores, and pro-
cesses – as data controller to inform the data subject about
the system’s privacy policy, or allow the data subject to spec-
ify consents in compliance with legislation, before users ac-
cessing the system. According to the definitions from the EU
Directive 95/46/EC [19]: “Controller shall mean the natural
or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data.” “The data
subject’s consent shall mean any freely given specific and
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him be-
ing processed.”
A policy specifies one or more rules with respect to data
protection. These are general rules determined by the stake-
holders of the system. Consents specify one or more data
protection rules as well, however, these rules are determined
by the user and only relate to the data regarding this spe-
cific user. The policy and consent compliance property es-
sentially ensures that the system’s policy and the user’s con-
sent, specified in textual form, are indeed implemented and
enforced.
This property is closely related to legislation. There are
a number of legal frameworks addressing the raised con-
cerns of data protection, such as the Health issued the Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [20] in the
United States, the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [19]
in Europe, the Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Documents Act and Privacy Act [21] in Canada, the
Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 and Privacy Amendment
(Private Sector) Act 2000 [22] in Australia, and the OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data [23].
One example of consent compliance is in e-health, for
some countries, healthcare professionals are not allowed to
intervene until the data subject has given informed consent
for medical treatment.
There are initiatives to protect data subjects and create
openness; however it is evidently important to ensure that
internal rules actually comply with that promised in policies
and consents. Unfortunately, few technical solutions exist to
guarantee the compliance. A possible non-technical solution
is to use employee contracts to enforce penalties (e.g., get
fired or pay fines) to ensure compliance. Another solution is
to hire an auditor to check policies compliance. Eventually,
necessary legal actions can be taken by data subjects in case
of noncompliance.
Breaux et al. [24] pointed out that to ensure a product
that complies with its privacy and security goals, legal re-
quirements need to be identified and refined into product
requirements, and the product requirements need to be in-
tegrated into the ongoing product design and testing pro-
cesses. They presented an industry case study in which re-
quirements of Cisco products were specified to comply with
Section 508 of the U.S. Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
of 1998 [25]. They developed a set of qualitative metrics to
rationalize the comparison of two requirements. These met-
rics demonstrate that alignments between legal and product
requirements can be described in detail by using the goal-
oriented concept of refinement. Their analysis revealed that
a frame-based requirements analysis method [26], which
itemizes requirements and preserves legal language, is use-
ful to incorporate legal requirements into a manufacturer’s
compliance framework.
5 Mapping privacy threats to DFD
In this section, we present the privacy threat categories based
on the above-mentioned privacy properties. We also discuss
how to map these categories to the DFD elements.
5.1 Privacy threat categories
As shown in Table 2, the methodology considers seven types
of threats. LINDDUN is the mnemonic acronym that we use.
The following section describes LINDDUN components:
1. Linkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g.,
subjects, messages, actions, etc.) allows an attacker to
sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or
not within the system.
2. Identifiability of a subject means that the attacker can
sufficiently identify the subject associated to an IOI, for
instance, the sender of a message. Usually, identifiability
refers to a set of potential subjects, called the identifia-
bility set [10]. In essence, identifiability is a special case
8Table 2 In the LINDDUN methodology, privacy properties and the
corresponding privacy threat are categorized as hard privacy and soft
privacy
of linkability when a subject and its attributes are in-
volved. Identifiability is a threat to both anonymity and
pseudonymity.
3. Non-repudiation, in contrast to security, this is a threat
for privacy. Non-repudiation allows an attacker to gather
evidence to counter the claims of the repudiating party,
and to prove that a user knows, has done or has said
something.
4. Detectability of an IOI means that the attacker can suf-
ficiently distinguish whether such an item exists or not.
If we consider messages as IOIs, it means that messages
are sufficiently discernible from random noise.
5. Information Disclosure threats expose personal informa-
tion to individuals who are not suppose to have access to
it.
6. Content Unawareness indicates that a user is unaware of
the information disclosed to the system. The user either
provides too much information which allows an attacker
to easily retrieve the user’s identity or inaccurate infor-
mation which can cause wrong decisions or actions.
7. Policy and consent Noncompliance means that even
though the system shows its privacy policies to its users,
there is no guarantee that the system actually complies
to the advertised policies. Therefore, the user’s personal
data might still be revealed.
5.2 Mapping privacy threat categories to the system
This section provides the guidelines to identify privacy threats
of a software based system. First, a Data Flow Diagram
(DFD) is created in correspondence to the application’s use
case scenarios. Second, privacy threats are mapped to the
DFD.
5.2.1 Creating Application DFD Based On Use Case
Scenarios
DFD is chosen to represent a software system based on two
reasons. First, DFD is proven to be sufficiently expressive




Data Store Social network DB
Data Flow User data stream (user-portal)
Service data stream(portal-service)
DB data stream (service DB)
Table 4 Mapping LINDDUN components (privacy threats) to DFD
element types (E-Entity, DF-Data flow, DS-Data store, P-Process)
Threat categories E DF DS P
Linkability    
Identifiability    
Non-repudiation   
Detectability   
Information Disclosure   
content Unawareness 
policy/consent Noncompliance   
in a number of case studies examined by the authors. Sec-
ond, DFD is also used by the SDL threat modeling process,
hence by deploying the same modeling technique an inter-
esting synergy can be created between the proposed frame-
work and the SDL process.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
In our running example Social Network 2.0, Alice is a
registered user of a social network. Each time Alice updates
her friends list, she first connects to the social network’s web
portal. Accordingly, the portal communicates with the social
network’s server, and eventually, the friendship information
of Alice and all other users of that social network is stored
in a database.
The DFD for the Social Network 2.0 application was al-
ready presented in Figure 1 of Section 2. Table 3 lists the
DFD elements.
The creation of the DFD is an important part in the anal-
ysis. If the DFD was incorrect, the analysis results would
be wrong as well. Since privacy focuses on the protection
of user’s personal information, it is important to consider
where the information will be stored or passed by, as these
are the crucial elements for building in privacy.
5.2.2 Mapping Privacy Threats to DFD
After the DFD elements are listed, we identify the privacy
threat categories for each DFD element by following the
mapping depicted in Table 4. Each intersection marked with
the symbol  indicates a potential privacy threat at a corre-
sponding DFD element in the system.
9In essence, each DFD element is subject to certain pri-
vacy threats, and the nature of the potential privacy threat
is determined by the DFD element type. For example, a data
flow is subject to a number of privacy threats such as identifi-
ability, linkability, detectability, non-repudiation, and infor-
mation disclosure. The following sections will explain how
privacy threats affect DFD elements. More threat scenarios
corresponding to our running example will be discussed in
Section 7.
The nature of linkability indicates that the threat affects
DFD elements by pair. In other words, linkability of a DFD
element refers to a pair (x1;x2), where x 2 fE;DF;DS;Pg is
the linkable IOI. Obviously, linkability at entity, from an at-
tackers perspective means that within the system (compris-
ing these and possibly other items), the attacker can suffi-
ciently distinguish whether these entities are related or not.
Similar description applies for that of data flow, data store,
and process.
The identifiability threat affects all four DFD elements,
such that each DFD element is made explicit as the attributes
that identifiability (or its opposite property anonymity) re-
lates to, by forming a pair with a subject. Essentially, iden-
tifiability at each DFD element refers to a pair (x;y), where
x 2 fEg is the identifiable subject, and y 2 fE;DS;DF;Pg is
the attribute identifiability relates to. For example, identifi-
ability at entity refers to a pair (E;E), meaning to identify
an entity within a set of entities. Identifiability at data flow
refers to a pair (E;DF), meaning that a message is linkable
to a potentially sending or receiving subject. Identifiability
at data store refers to a pair (E;DS), meaning that a database
entry is linkable to a potential data holder or subject. Iden-
tifiability at process refers to a pair (E;P), meaning that a
process is linkable to a potentially accessing subject.
Non-repudiation, opposite of plausible deniability, is a
privacy threat that affects the DFD elements of data flow,
data store and process. Non-repudiation might be appreci-
ated for some system but undesirable for others. It depends
on the system requirements. For e-commerce applications,
non-repudiation is an important security property. Imagine
a situation where a buyer signs for a purchased item upon
receipt, the vendor can later use the signed receipt as ev-
idence that the user received the item. For other applica-
tions, such as off-the-record conversations, participants may
desire plausible deniability for privacy protection such that
there will be no record to demonstrate the communication
event, the participants and the content. In this scenario, non-
repudiation is a privacy threat. Even though entity is the
only DFD element being able to (non-)repudiate, the non-
repudiation privacy threat actually occurs at data flow, data
store, and process. Similar to linkability and identifiabil-
ity, non-repudiation at each DFD element refers to a pair
(x;y), where x 2 fEg is the non-repudiating subject, and
y 2 fDS;DF;Pg is the attribute it relates to.
Table 5 Determining privacy threats for DFD elements within the
Social Network 2.0 application (From left to right: L-Linkability,
I-Identifiability, N-Non Repudiation, D-Detectability, D-Information
Disclosure, U-Content Unawareness, N-Consent/policy Noncompli-
ance)
Threat target L I N D D U N
Data
Store
Social network DB 1 4   7 10
Data
Flow
User data stream (user
– portal)
2 5   8 10*
Service data stream
(portal – service)
     10*
DB data stream (ser-
vice – DB)
     10*
Process Portal      10*
Social network service      10*
Entity User 3 6 9
Detectability threats occur at data flow, data store, and
process, meaning that the attacker can sufficiently distin-
guish whether it exists or not. Though in some applications,
techniques such as covert channel and steganography can be
used to protect both messages (data flow) and communicat-
ing parties (entity), in this case the threat actually occurs at
data flow instead of entity. In other words, the asset we want
to protect against the detectability threat includes data flow,
data store, and process.
Information disclosure threats affect data flow, data store,
and process, referring to the exposure of information at these
DFD elements to individuals who are not supposed to have
access to it.
The content unawareness threat is related to entity, since
the entity (data subject or data controller) is actually respon-
sible to provide the necessary consents to process personal
data and update or delete the expired information.
Policy and consent noncompliance is a threat that affects
system as a whole, because each system component (includ-
ing data flow, data store and process) is responsible to ensure
that actions are taken in compliance with privacy policies
and data subject’s consents.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
Considering the Social Network 2.0 application, the list of
generic privacy threats to the modeled system is depicted
in Table 5. This is obtained by gathering the elements from
Table 3 and then determining the susceptible threats with
Table 4.
The intersections marked with in Table 5 are potential
threats that have been considered as irrelevant to the spe-
cific usage scenario. Each intersection that is indicated with
a number (1 to 10) in Table 5 shows that there will be a pri-
vacy threat at the corresponding DFD element. These items
marked with a number are the threats which we will actually
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consider. The number represents the ID of the generic threat
and will be used later for ease of reference.
Primarily, we assume that DFD elements within the trust
boundary (marked as dashed line in Figure 1) are trustwor-
thy. We trust the processes within the boundary, as well as all
data flows in the trust boundary. Therefore, we will not dis-
cuss linkability, identifiability, and information disclosure
threats on these elements. We however do not trust the user
and its communication with the portal and we also want to
protect the data store containing all the user’s information.
Moreover, non-repudiation and detectability threats are
considered irrelevant for social networks. Presumably, it de-
pends on what privacy properties are required for a particu-
lar social network system. In case plausible deniability and
undetectability would be desirable for a certain application,
we should still consider these threats for each DFD element
accordingly.
Following the above reasoning, ten threats will be exam-
ined in detail in Section 7, and they are numbered in Table 5.
Note that some items are indicated with a 10. This means
that the policy and consent noncompliance threat affects the
system as a whole (including data flow, data store and pro-
cess). However, we will only illustrate one misuse case for
this threat in this paper.
6 Detailing privacy threats via threat tree patterns
This section presents an extensive catalog of threat tree pat-
terns that can be used to detail the privacy threats to a re-
alistic system. For each marked intersection in Table 4, a
threat tree pattern exists showing the detailed preconditions
for this specific threat category to materialize. The precon-
ditions are hence vulnerabilities that can be exploited for a
privacy attack scenario.
The present catalog is based on the state-of-art privacy
developments and the threat trees reflect common attack pat-
terns and help application designers think about privacy con-
ditions in the system. However, the threat trees depicted in
this section present the best effort so far. The catalog is sub-
ject to continuous improvement in order to reflect newly dis-
covered threats. Further, the catalog is meant to be updated
as new results are available from the industrial validation
experiments.
6.1 Linkability of entity
Linkability of entity refers to an attacker can sufficiently dis-
tinguish whether two or more entities are related or not within
the system. This implies that different pseudonyms can be
linked to each other. The threat tree pattern is depicted in
Figure 4. One precondition is that data flow or data store
is not fully protected (e.g. unencrypted), which leads to the
Fig. 4 Threat tree for linkability of an entity
Information Disclosure threat of data flow and data store.
The second precondition is that Personal Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII) can be linked, e.g. based on user temporary ID,
IP address, behavioral patterns such as time, frequency and
location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer ID,
communication content or any combination of these factors.
The aforementioned data store refers to the identity manage-
ment system’s database or any other database which con-
tains personal identifiers of users. Having accessed such a
data store, the attacker could easily link different pseudo-
nyms to the same user
6.2 Linkability of data flow
Linkability of data flow threat tree, as presented in Figure
5, suggests two preconditions. One precondition is that data
flows are not fully protected (e.g. unencrypted), which leads
to information disclosure of data flow; and communications
are linkable due to little or insecure anonymity systems de-
ployed. The other precondition is that communication can
be linked. When no anonymous communication is deployed,
basically the same preconditions apply as for the linkabil-
ity of entity threat. Messages are linked to each other by
user’s identifiable information (e.g. based on user temporary
ID, IP address, behavioral patterns such as time, frequency
and location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer
ID, communication content or any combination of these fac-
tors). Alternatively, when an insecure anonymity system is
deployed, traffic analysis is possible to extract information
out of patterns of traffic; passive attacks (e.g. long-term in-
tersection attacks, traffic correlation and confirmation, fin-
gerprinting, epistemic attacks (route selection), and prede-
cessor attacks) and active attacks (e.g. N-1 attacks, Sybil at-
tack, traffic watermarking, tagging attack, replay, and DoS
attack) are possible to link entities together. An overview of
these attacks can be found in [27].
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Fig. 5 Threat tree for linkability of a data flow
6.3 Linkability of data store
Two preconditions correspond to the threat of linkability of
a data store, as shown in Figure 6. First, there is insuffi-
cient access control of the data store leading to the infor-
mation disclosure threat at a data store. Second, insufficient
data anonymization is applied or strong data mining is pos-
sible in the data store, meaning that the stored information
still contains sufficient references to the corresponding data
subject, which makes it possible to link different data items
to each other within the same database. Another possibility
is that data can be linked from one database to another, and
hence re-identification [28] is possible.
Fig. 6 Threat tree for linkability of a data store
6.4 Linkability of process
The threat tree of linkability of process suggests that the only
way to prevent different actions being linked to the same
subject is by gaining access to the process, as illustrated in
Figure 7.
Fig. 7 Threat tree for linkability of a process
6.5 Identifiability of entity
Figure 8 shows the threat tree pattern for identifiability of
entity. It gives an overview of the most common situations
where an identifiability threat can occur at an entity. A first
precondition is when the e-id is used as login (i.e., the user’s
actual identity is used), meanwhile the data flow between
the user and login portal is not sufficiently protected (i.e.,
the threat of information disclosure of data flow), and thus
the user’s identity will be exposed. A second possibility oc-
curs when a secret (e.g. a password) is used as log-in and the
relationship between this secret and the user can be revealed.
This can happen if the identity management database in not
secure (e.g. passwords are stored in clear); if the communi-
cation channel is insecure and the communicated passwords
are weak and can be connected to the user (e.g. using a
birthdate as password); or if replay attacks are possible (e.g.
a keylogger is installed, the communication can be eaves-
dropped or the person entering the secret can be observed).
A third possible precondition for the threat is the use of a
token as log-in which is weakly implemented or physically
insecure. The final precondition is that biometrics is used as
log-in, which means that biometrics is retrievable and can
be linked to an entity. It is due to information disclosure of
identity management database or data flow which contains
biometrics, and linkability at data store.
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Fig. 8 Threat tree for identifiability of an entity
6.6 Identifiability of data flow
The threat tree of identifiability of data flow is presented
in Figure 9. Similar to the linkability of data flow threat
tree, identifiability of data flow is possible when data flows
are not fully protected, which leads to information disclo-
sure of data flow; or when the communication can be traced
to an entity due to little or insecure anonymity system de-
ployed. When no anonymity system is deployed, commu-
nication can be traced to an entity by means of identifiable
information (e.g. based on user temporary ID, IP address,
behavioral patterns such as time, frequency and location,
session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer ID, commu-
nication content or any combination of these factors). Alter-
natively, when an insecure anonymity system is deployed,
traffic analysis, passive attacks, and active attacks [27] are
possible to identify the particularly entity of interests.
Fig. 9 Threat tree for identifiability of a data flow
6.7 Identifiability of data store
The preconditions for identifiability of data store, as pre-
sented in Figure 10, are similar to the preconditions of link-
ability at a data store. Either there is insufficient access con-
trol of the data store which refers to the information disclo-
sure threat of a data store; or insufficient data anonymization
or strong data mining techniques where applied in the data
store, which means that the information stored still contains
sufficient references to the corresponding person to reveal
the person’s identity, and hence it refers to the identifiability
threat of entity or the data can be linked with other relevant
information which can lead to re-identification of the data
subject.
Fig. 10 Threat tree for identifiability of a data store
6.8 Identifiability of process
The threat tree of identifiability of process is presented in
Figure 11. The only condition for the identifiability threat
at a process is when access to the process is not sufficiently
secured, and thus it refers to the threat of information dis-
closure of a process.
Fig. 11 Threat tree for identifiability of a process
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6.9 Non-repudiation of data flow
Fig. 12 Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a data flow
Four general preconditions can be applied to the threat
tree of non-repudiation of data flow, as presented in Figure
12. One condition is insufficient obfuscation for data sources
or data flows, which means that the attacker can gain access
to at least part of the data flow or data source. This can oc-
cur in a number of cases, for example, there is no automatic
replay of broadcasts, such that the sender of a file is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from those who are merely relaying
it. Another example is when a complete decrypted log of
all network connections to and from a user’s computer is
disclosed, resulting in the disclosure of the origin of data
flow. The final examples are that there is insufficient protec-
tion against censors or insufficient obfuscation of data ex-
tensions, such that operators or users of the network are able
to know where the data comes from.
The second precondition of this threat is that little or a
weak deniable encryption technique is used to protect data
flow. One possible attack path is to prove data is encrypted,
either due to the encrypter proves the data is obviously an
encryption or colluding users prove together that the data is
encrypted. The second attack path is to prove data can be
decrypted to a valid plain text, which can occur when the
encrypter decrypts the file or colluding users can cooper-
ate and show the decrypted message. The third attack path
shows that all private keys are disclosed, and the last path
suggests that cryptanalysis is possible to attack the used en-
cryption scheme.
The third condition is that there are little or weak mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) used to ensure integrity of
data flow content, such that an attacker can forge authentic
looking messages and pretend that a certain data flow comes
from a subject.
The final precondition indicates that there is little or a
weak Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR) used, such that in
a conversation it is not possible to provide both deniability
for the conversation participants and confidentiality of con-
versations content at the same time. Possible attack paths
include replaying of previous transferred messages, and the
use of signatures to demonstrate communication events, par-
ticipants and communication content.
6.10 Non-repudiation of data store
The threat tree for non-repudiation of data store is depicted
in Figure 13. Three preconditions can apply to this threat,
namely a weak access control to the database, which leads
to the threat of information disclosure at the data store; little
or a weak deniable encrypted is used to protect the data,
such that data can be proven to be an encryption or can be
decrypted to a valid plaintext; and subjects with deniability
are not able to edit data in the database to cover their tracks,
and it can be either impossible to remove or alter the user’s
own data or impossible to remove or alter someone elses
data concerning the user himself.
Fig. 13 Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a data store
6.11 Non-repudiation of process
Non-repudiation of process, as depicted in Figure 14 can be
achieved in two ways: either the process looses its confi-
dentiality and information disclosure attacks at the process
are possible, or the process uses a secure log to create an
overview of all actions, which can evidently be traced back
to the user.
6.12 Detectability of data flow
The threat tree of detectability of data flow, as depicted in
Figure 15 suggests five preconditions for the threat to oc-
cur. One condition is that the system lacks a covert chan-
nel. This can happen when the covert channel uses too much
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Fig. 14 Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a process
bandwidth from a legitimate channel, resulting in the detec-
tion of the covert communication. It can also be because the
patterns or characteristics of the communications medium
of the legitimate channel are controlled or examined by le-
gitimate users, e.g. checking file opening and closing op-
erations patterns or watching the timing of requests, such
that covert communication is detected. The second condi-
tion is side channel analysis on timing information, power
consumption, electromagnetic leaks, as an extra source of
information which can be exploited to detect the communi-
cation. The third condition occurs when a weak information
hiding techniques are used, which makes a number of ste-
ganalysis attacks possible. Another condition is when there
is no or insufficient dummy traffic sent at some lower layer
of communication network, such that messages fail to ap-
pear random for all parties except the sender and the recip-
ient(s). Last but not least, the threat can occur because of
a weak spread spectrum communication, resulting in defi-
ciencies in the establishment of secure communications, re-
sistance to natural interference and jamming, and detection
prevention.
Fig. 15 Threat tree for detectability of a data flow
6.13 Detectability of data store
As shown in Figure 16, detectability threats in a data store
can occur if there is insufficient access control, which leads
to the information disclosure threats for security, or if in-
sufficient information hiding techniques are applied, such
as information from a data store is revealed due to weak
steganography algorithms employed.
Fig. 16 Threat tree for detectability of a data store
6.14 Detectability of process
Similar to the previously described threats related to a pro-
cess, the detectability of process threat, depicted in Figure
17, also refers to the threat of information disclosure of pro-
cess.
Fig. 17 Threat tree for detectability of a process
6.15 Information disclosure of data flow, data store, and
process
The threat tree concerning information disclosure of data
flow, data store, and process, depicted in Figure 18, refers
to the security threat tree of information disclosure. This il-
lustrates the fact that privacy properties are part of security
properties, and privacy may depend on security. For more in-
formation about the information disclosure threats we refer
to SDL [3].
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Fig. 18 Threat tree for Information Disclosure
6.16 Content unawareness of entity
Content unawareness of an entity can occur in two situa-
tions: either the date subject provides more personal iden-
tifiable information than required, which has a negative in-
fluence on all the hard privacy objectives; or data subject
does not keep information updated or does not remove the
outdated information, and it can lead to wrong actions when
decisions are based on this information.
Fig. 19 Threat tree for Content Unawareness
6.17 Consent and policy noncompliance of the system
(data flow, process and data store)
The user’s privacy can be violated when internal system rules
do not correspond to privacy policies provided to the user.
This can occur when an attacker tampers with the internal
policies, which is actually a security threat; or when the pol-
icy rules are incorrectly managed or updated (according to
the user’s requests) by the system administrator.
7 Documenting Threats Scenarios in Misuse Cases
Threat tree patterns are used to detail the generic LINDDUN
threat categories into specific threat instances that can occur
in a system. Furthermore, some threat instances could have
been discarded during the risk-analysis step. The result of
Fig. 20 Threat tree for policy and consent noncompliance
the above process should be a collection of threat scenar-
ios that need to be documented. To this aim, misuse cases
can be used. In particular, a misuse case can be considered
as a use case from the misactor’s point of view. A misactor
is someone who intentionally or unintentionally initiates the
misuse case. Alexander [29] provides some example misuse
cases, together with the corresponding (positive) use cases.
We chose misuse cases because they represent a well es-
tablished technique to elicit requirements, and a number of
support tools exist as well.
The structure of a misuse case, which is based on the
template provided by Sindre and Opdahl [6] is described be-
low:
Summary: provides a brief description of the threat.
Assets, stakeholders and threats: describes the assets being
threatened, their importance to the different stakeholders,
and what is the potential damage if the misuse case suc-
ceeds.
Primary misactor: describes the type of misactor perform-
ing the misuse-case. Possible types are insiders, people with
a certain technical skill, and so on. Also, some misuse case
could occur accidentally whereas other are most likely to be
performed intentionally.
Basic Flow: discusses the normal flow of actions, resulting
in a successful attack for the misactor.
Alternative Flows: describes the other ways the misuse can
occur.
Trigger: describes how and when the misuse case is initi-
ated.
Preconditions: precondition that the system must meet for
the attack to be feasible.
The preconditions refer to the leaf nodes of the threat
tree patterns and the basic (and alternative) flow describes
how a miuser could exploit these weaknesses of the system
in order to mount an attack.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
In our running example, we assume that communication
and processes within the social network service provider are
16
trustworthy (see the trust boundary in the DFD depicted in
Figure 1). However, we want to protect the data store against
information disclosure. The data controllers could be users,
social network providers, and application providers.
To illustrate how to create a misuse case based on the
threat tree patterns, consider the threat tree of linkability at
the data store (see Figure 6). The tree illustrates that in or-
der to be susceptible to this threat, neither the data store is
sufficiently protected against information disclosure nor suf-
ficient data anonymization techniques are employed. These
are the preconditions of the misuse case. To create the attack
scenarios, it is clear that the attacker first needs to have ac-
cess to the data store, and secondly, either the user (as the
data subject) can be re-identified (as the basic flow) or the
pseudonyms can be linkable (as the alternative flow). The
aforementioned misuse case is presented in this section. The
additional nine misuse cases applicable to the social network
example are described in Appendix A.
Title: MUC 1 – Linkability of social network database (data
store)
Summary: Data entries can be linked to the same person
(without necessarily revealing the persons identity)
Assets, stakeholders and threats: Personal Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII) of the user.
– The user:
– Data entries can be linked to each other which might
reveal the persons identity
– The misactor can build a profile of a user’s online
activities (interests, actives time, comments, updates,
etc.)
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The misactor can link the data entries together and pos-
sibly re-identify the data subject from the data content
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. Each data entry is linked to a pseudonym
3. The misactor can link the different pseudonyms together
(linkability of entity)
4. Based on the pseudonyms, the misactor can link the dif-
ferent data entries
Trigger: by misactor, can always happen.
Preconditions:
– no or insufficient protection of the data store
– no or insufficient data anonymization techniques or strong
data mining applied
Note that formulating soft privacy threats is less straight-
forward and requires some out-of-the-box thinking for suit-
able (non-)technical solutions. We refer the reader to misuse
cases 9 and 10 in the appendix as an example of the latter
case.
7.1 Risk Assessment
Similarly to STRIDE, LINDDUN can suggest a (large) num-
ber of documented threats. Before the process moves for-
ward, the identified threats must be prioritized. Only the im-
portant ones should be considered for inclusion in the re-
quirements specification and, consequently, in the design of
the solution. Risk assessment techniques provide support for
this stage. In general, risk is calculated as a function of the
likelihood of the attack scenario depicted in the MUC (mis-
use case) and its impact. The risk value is used to sort the
MUCs: the higher the risk, the more important the MUC is.
The LINDDUN framework (similarly to STRIDE) is in-
dependent from the specific risk assessment technique that is
used. The analyst is free to pick the technique of choice, for
instance the OWASP’s Risk Rating Methodology [30], Mi-
crosoft’s DREAD [31], NIST’s Special Publication 800-30
[32], or SEI’s OCTAVE [33]. These techniques leverage the
information contained in the MUC, as the involved assets
(for the impact), and the attacker profile as well as the ba-
sic/alternative flows (for the likelihood). Many of the above-
mentioned techniques include privacy considerations when
assessing the impact of a threat. However, as a research chal-
lenge, a privacy-specific risk assessment technique is worth-
while to be investigated, as the on-field experience reveals
any inadequacy of state-of-the-art techniques. This goes be-
yond the scope of this work.
8 From threat analysis to privacy enhancing solutions
This section explains the elicitation of privacy requirements
from threat analysis and the selection of mitigation strategies
and techniques based on privacy objectives.
8.1 Eliciting Privacy Requirements: From Privacy Threat
Analysis to Mitigation Strategy
Misuse cases describe the relevant (risk-wise) threat scenar-
ios for the system. The preconditions are based on the threat
tree patterns and the basic and alternative flows are inspired
by the system’s use cases.
As a next step, the system’s (positive) requirements can
be extracted from the misuse cases. To this aim, the specifi-
cation of the privacy requirements is facilitated by Table 6,
which maps the types of threats scenarios to types of privacy
requirements. Note that the table is a refinement of the more
generic objectives in Table 2.
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Table 6 Privacy objectives based on LINDDUN threat types (E-Entity,
DF-Data Flow, DS-Data Store, P-Process)
LINDDUN threats Elementary privacy objectives
Linkability of (E;E) Unlinkability of (E;E)
Linkability of (DF;DF) Unlinkability of (DF;DF)
Linkability of (DS;DS) Unlinkability of (DS;DS)
Linkability of (P;P) Unlinkability of (P;P)
Identifiability of (E;E) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E;E)
Identifiability of (E;DF) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E;DF)
Identifiability of (E;DS) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E;DS)
Identifiability of (E;P) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E;P)
Non-repudiation of (E;DF) Plausible deniability of (E;DF)
Non-repudiation of (E;DS) Plausible deniability of (E;DS)
Non-repudiation of (E;P) Plausible deniability of (E;P)
Detectability of DF Undetectability of DF
Detectability of DS Undetectability of DS




Information Disclosure ofDS Confidentiality of DS
Information Disclosure of P Confidentiality of P
Content Unawareness of E Content awareness of E
Policy and consent Noncom-
pliance of the system
Policy and consent compliance of
the system
8.2 From Privacy Requirements to Privacy Enhancing
Solutions
Similarly to security, privacy requirements can be satisfied
via a range of solution strategies:
1. Warn the user could be a valid strategy for lower risk
(but still relevant) threats. However precautions have to
be taken so that users, especially nontechnical ones, do
not make poor trust decisions.
2. Removing or turning off the feature is the only way to
reduce the risk to zero. When threat models indicate that
the risk is too great or the mitigation techniques are un-
tenable, it is best not to build the feature in the first place,
in order to gain a balance between user features and po-
tential privacy risks.
3. Countering threats with either preventive or reactive pri-
vacy enhancing technology is the most commonly used
strategy to solve specific issues.
This section mainly focuses on the last strategy. When
countering threats with technology is chosen as the mitiga-
tion strategy, system designers have to identify the sound
and appropriate privacy enhancing technology (PET). We
summarize the state-of-art PETs in Table 7 and map these
techniques to each of the corresponding privacy requirements
of Table 6. As a result, improved guidance is provided to the
system designers over the solution selection process.
Note that the PETs categorization is inspired by the tax-
onomies proposed in [34,35]. Further, Table 7 introduces
some key primitives of hard privacy technologies and the
state-of-art of soft privacy technologies. New privacy en-
hancing solutions keep emerging; therefore a complete list
of PETs and best practices for choosing the appropriate mit-
igation is beyond the scope of this paper. The latest devel-
opment of privacy enhancing technologies can be found at
[36].
In summary, privacy protection solutions boil down to
either technical or legal enforcement. In general, privacy
technology enables functionality while offering the high-
est protection for privacy. Further, Hard Privacy Technology
provides cryptographically strong protections for privacy,
assumes no unnecessary leakage of information, and replies
on massive distribution of trust excluding potential adver-
sary and privacy violators. Soft Privacy Technology (e.g. pri-
vacy policy and feedback tools in Table 7) offers protections
against mass surveillance and violations, assumes data sub-
jects sharing of personal data is necessary, and employs a
weaker adversary model.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
Table 8 summarizes the selection of PETs based on the
privacy requirements elicited in our running example. It is
possible that a more business oriented example would sug-
gest different mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, we hope
the example depicted in this section can illustrate how the
proposed framework can be applied in real life applications.
In an attempt to make the running example more ac-
cessible to the reader, the system model, the misuse cases,
and the mitigation techniques of the Social Network 2.0 are
largely simplified due to the assumption that the social net-
work providers are semi-trustworthy (i.e., the adversary model
consists of external parties, data holder, honest insiders who
make errors, and corrupt insiders). If different assumptions
would hold, different misuse cases should be identified with
a distinct mitigation approach. For instance, if we apply a
smaller trust boundary and assume that the social network
provider is totally untrustworthy, then extra privacy require-
ments and a stronger threat model would be considered. One
possible misuse case would be that the malicious social net-
work provider, as an attacker, takes advantage of profiling
user’s personal data for its own benefits. In that scenario, one
solution could be building a security agriculture out of smart
clients and an untrusted central server to removes the need
for faith in network operators and gives users control of their
privacy [84]. Another solution could be using encryption to
enforce access control for users’ personal information based
on their privacy preferences [85,86].
Another research discussion is concerning practicality to
build user privacy feedback tools. In short, from a techni-
cal point of view, feedback could be realized by means of
data mining techniques (e.g., k-anonymity model) to coun-
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Table 7 Mapping privacy objectives with privacy enhancing techniques (U – Unlinkability, A – Anonymity / Pseudonymity, P – Plausible de-
niability, D – Undetectability / unobservability, C – Confidentiality, W – Content Awareness, O – Policy and consent compliance of the system)
Mitigation techniques: PETs U A P D C W O
Anonymity system Mix-networks (1981) [37], DC-networks (1985) [38,39],
ISDN-mixes [40], Onion Routing (1996) [41], Crowds (1998)
[42], Single proxy (90s) (Penet pseudonymous remailer
(1993-1996), Anonymizer, SafeWeb), anonymous Remailer
(Cipherpunk Type 0, Type 1 [43], Mixmaster Type 2 (1994)
[44], Mixminion Type 3 (2003) [45]), and Low-latency com-
munication (Freedom Network (1999-2001) [46], Java Anon
Proxy (JAP) (2000) [47], Tor (2004) [48])
  
DC-net & MIX-net + dummy traffic, ISDN-mixes [40]    
Broadcast systems [49,50] + dummy traffic   
Privacy preserving authen-
tication
Private authentication [51,52]  
Anonymous credentials (single show [53], multishow [54])  
Deniable authentication [55]   
Off-the-record messaging [56]    
Privacy preserving crypto-
graphic protocols
Multi-party computation (Secure function evaluation) [57,58]  
Anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol [59]   
Information retrieval Private information retrieval [60] + dummy traffic   
Oblivious transfer [61,62])   
Privacy preserving data mining [63,64]   
Searchable encryption [65], Private search [66]  
Data anonymization K-anonymity model [28,67], l-Diversity [68]  
Information hiding Steganography [69]   
Covert communication [70]   
Spread spectrum [71]   
Pseudonymity systems Privacy enhancing identity management system [72]  
User-controlled identity management system [73]  
Privacy preserving biometrics [74]   
Encryption techniques Symmetric key & public key encryption [75] 
Deniable encryption  
Homomorphic encryption [76] 
Verifiable encryption [77] 
Access control techniques Context-based access control [78] 
Privacy-aware access control [79,80] 
Policy and feedback tools Policy communication (P3P [18]) 
Policy enforcement (XACML [81], EPAL [82]) 
Feedback tools for user privacy awareness [16,17,83] 
Data removal tools (spyware removal, browser cleaning tools,
activity traces eraser, harddisk data eraser)

termeasure user identification and data profiling attacks. It
compares data user sends to the social network with a whole
set of data composed of data from all networks users, and
checks the “uniqueness” of personal identifiable information
(PII) of the user. With a unique PII, a user has a higher prob-
ability to be identified. Then it warns users each time their
activities provoke privacy risks, e.g. shows a risk level of
identifiability by posting a message “you are about to leave
the anonymity safe zone”. There are some research incen-
tives for feedback systems for social networks [16,17,83].
However, this concept implies a paradox that in order to en-
sure accurate feedback, the feedback tool itself should be
a “perfect attacker” that knows all the data from all users.
Due to the space and scope limit of this paper, we cannot
discuss this in detail. We encourage interested readers to for-
malize the feedback system model and investigate whether
it is technically realistic to realize the feedback concept and
beyond which threshold a feedback could be satisfactory. In-
tuitively speaking, the aforementioned feedback concept is
not about technical problem purely but more an education
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Table 8 Social Network 2.0 example: from misuse cases to privacy requirements and suggested mitigation strategies and techniques
No. Misuse cases Privacy requirements Suggested mitigation strategies and techniques
1 Linkability of social
network data store
Unlinkability of data entries within the so-
cial network database
Apply data anonymization techniques, such as k-anonymity
[67].
Protection of data store Enforce data protection by means of relationship-based ac-
cess control [79]
2 Linkability of data
flow of the user data
stream (user-portal)
Unlinkability of messages of user-portal
communication; channel confidentiality
Deploy anonymity system, such as TOR [48].
3 Linkability of enti-
ties the social net-
work users
Unlinkability of different pseudonyms
(user IDs) of social network users; chan-
nel confidentiality.
1) Technical enforcement: deploy anonymity system, such as
TOR [48], for communication between user and social net-
work web portal;
2) User privacy awareness: inform users that revealing too
much information online can be privacy invasive.
4 Identifiability at the
social network data
store
Anonymity of social network users such
that the user will not be identified from so-
cial network database entries
Protection of the data store, by applying data anonymization
techniques, such as k-anonymity [67].
Protection of data store Enforce data protection by means of relationship-based ac-
cess control [79]
5 Identifiability at data
flow of user data
stream (user-portal)
Anonymity of social network users such
that the user will not be identified from
user-portal communication by content;
channel confidentiality
Deploy anonymity system, such as TOR [48], for communi-
cation between user and social network web portal.
6 Identifiability of the
social network users
Pseudonymize users IDs 1) Apply secure pseudonymization techniques to issue pseu-
donyms as user IDs;
2) User privacy awareness: inform users using real ID has a
risk for privacy violation.
Use identity management to ensure un-
linkability is sufficiently preserved (as
seen by an attacker) between the partial
identities of an individual person required
by the applications
Employ privacy preserving identity management, e.g. pro-
posed in [72], together with user-controlled identity manage-
ment system [73] to ensure user-controlled linkability of per-
sonal data. System supports the user in making an informed
choice of pseudonyms, representing his or her partial identi-
ties. Make the flow of this user’s identity attributes explicit to
the user and gives its user a large degree of control.
Confidentiality of data flow in user-portal
communication
Deploy anonymity system such as TOR [48].
7 Information disclo-
sure at the social net-
work data store
Release of the social network data store
should be controlled according to user’s
privacy preference
Apply access control at the social network databases, e.g.




tion between the user
and the social net-
work
Confidentiality of communication be-
tween the user and the social network
should be ensured
Employ a secure communication channel and deploy ano-
nymity system such as TOR [48].
9 Content unaware-
ness of user
Users need to be aware that they only need
to provide minimal set of required per-
sonal data (the data minimization princi-
ple)
Use feedback tools to raise user’s privacy awareness.




Design system in compliance with legal
guidelines for privacy and data protection
1) Hire employee who is responsible for making the policies
compliant OR hire external company for compliancy auditing
2) Ensure training obligations for employees.
Ensure user aware that in case of viola-
tion, user is legitimated to take legal ac-
tions
E.g., user can sue the social network provider whenever users
personal data is not processed according to what is consented.
Employee contracts clearly specify do’s
and don’ts according to legal guidance
1) Ensure training obligations for employees;
2) Employees who disclose users information will be penal-
ized (get fired, pay fine, etc.).
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problem to raise user’s privacy awareness. The usability of
such feedback tools is also an issue, such as how to design a
user friendly interface and encourage users to use feedback
remains a research challenge.
9 Related work
9.1 Privacy requirements analysis
Mylopoulos et al. [87] are the first to point out that complex-
ity of an information system is determined partly by its func-
tionality (i.e. what the system does) and partly by its non-
functional requirements (also referred as constrains, goals,
and quality attributes), and the non-functional requirements
“play a crucial role during system development, serving as
selection criteria for choosing among myriads of decisions”.
They proposed a comprehensive framework for represent-
ing and using non-functional requirements during the devel-
opment process in a process-oriented approach. The frame-
work consists of five basic components – goals, link types,
methods (i.e., goal decomposition methods, goal satisfic-
ing methods, and argumentation methods), correlation rules,
and the labeling procedure – as the representation of non-
functional requirements in terms of interrelated goals. As
suggested by Mylopoulos et al., “such goals can be refined
through refinement methods and can be evaluated in order
to determine the degree to which a set of non-functional re-
quirements is supported by a particular design” [87]. This
framework can serve as the foundation for the aforemen-
tioned privacy requirement analysis methodology.
The privacy guidelines provided by Microsoft describes
some basic privacy concepts [88], such as different types of
consents or data minimization concepts. Besides, a number
of guidelines are presented for selected scenarios concern-
ing the following principles: notice, choice, onward transfer,
access, security, and data integrity. However, it only con-
tains a flat list of the required and recommended guidelines
and does not intend to describe a more structured approach.
These guidelines can still be used as inspiration to determine
possible threats, e.g. to extend our catalogue of threat trees.
In the documentation of SDL version 3.2 [89], privacy
is also partially considered, but only at a generic level. For
example, the threat modeling process described in the forth
stage of SDL only mentions that a design review with the
privacy expert is necessary. SDL also presents ten general
privacy guidelines. An example guideline indicates that it is
important to collect the least sensitive form of data. At this
stage, privacy is not yet well integrated in SDL.
Yu and Cysneiros [90] presented a framework using i,
an agent-oriented requirements modeling language, to deal
with privacy requirements. This framework however focuses
on reasoning about privacy and does not provide a struc-
tured methodology to examine the different privacy objec-
tives. Liu et al. [91] proposed a framework also using i
to deal with security and privacy requirements, which was
inspired by the work of Yu and Cysneiros. They use four
different analysis techniques to create a complete model: at-
tacker analysis, dependency vulnerability analysis, counter-
measure analysis and access control analysis. Although this
framework contains the attacker analysis technique which is
similar to our idea of examining the possible privacy threats,
the framework is again mainly meant to reason about privacy
but lacks the necessary knowledge to empower the (non-
expert) privacy analyst.
Miyazaki et al. [92] defined a computer-aided privacy
requirements elicitation technique. This technique returns
the appropriate requirements for the system to be compli-
ant with the law, based on a questionnaire that the system
engineer fills out. This is in contrast to our methodology,
which helps the analyst eliciting the privacy requirements in
accordance to the stakeholders’ wishes.
9.2 From privacy requirements to privacy solutions
Several taxonomies have been proposed to create a link be-
tween privacy requirements and privacy solutions. This sec-
tion gives an overview of some existing taxonomies which
can be integrated in our threat modeling process to link the
privacy requirements obtained by our methodology to the
optimal privacy enhancing solution(s).
The taxonomy of privacy goals, described by Anto´n et
al. [93], is to analyze website privacy requirements. Privacy
goals are divided into protection goals and (anti) vulnerabi-
lity goals. The Code for Fair Information Practices is used
to categorize the protection goals, namely notice and aware-
ness, choice and consent, access and participation, integrity
and security, and enforcement and redress. The (anti) vulner-
ability goals are classified according to the manner in which
they violate the users privacy. The corresponding goals are
monitoring, aggregation, storage, and information transfer.
These goals are used to analyze and compare privacy poli-
cies and do not intend to link privacy requirements to gen-
eral privacy solutions, instead, limited to website privacy re-
quirements.
The Pris method [35] presents a structured way to create
systems which adhere to the specified privacy requirements.
It consists of four different phases: 1) Elicit privacy-related
goals, 2) Analyze the impact of privacy goals on organiza-
tional processes, 3) Model affected processes using privacy-
process patterns, and 4) Identify the technique(s) that best
support or implement the above processes. The last step uses
a table that classifies privacy implementation techniques in
six categories, a) Administrative tools, b) Information tools,
c) Anonymizer products, services and architectures, d) Pseu-
donymizer tools, e) Track and evidence erasers, and f) En-
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cryption tools, and it can be an interesting source of inspira-
tion to determine appropriate privacy solutions.
Wuyts et al. [34] created a hierarchical taxonomy which
categorizes privacy into objectives. The objectives are di-
vided in two branches. The proactive branch focuses on con-
cealing the association between the data and the identity of
the user before it is shared with the system, while the reac-
tive branch focuses on guarding the relationship between the
data and the identity when the data is already shared. Each
objective corresponds to a number of strategies, which are
a sub-classification of the objectives. These strategies can
then be linked to their corresponding solutions. This paper
only provides a sample solution for each category and does
not provide a full overview of all existing solutions.
10 Discussion
Despite the fact that the dualism between hard and soft pri-
vacy has already been generically introduced in a few talks
[94,12], to our best knowledge, this paper is the first effort
that concretely distinguishes these two concepts and catego-
rizes privacy properties (and threats) accordingly. In short,
hard privacy properties include unlinkability, anonymity and
pseudonymity, plausible deniability, undetectability and un-
observability, and confidentiality. Soft privacy properties in-
clude content unawareness and policy and consent compli-
ance. Similarly, leveraging the link between privacy enhan-
cing technologies and privacy objectives, it is possible to
make a distinction between hard and soft solutions. Hard
privacy technologies are active in research but poor in de-
ployment, due to cost and technical evolvement restrictions
(such as cryptography). Soft privacy technologies are state-
of-art and have fewer research activities. With legal compli-
ance as a strong driver, soft privacy solutions reply on stake-
holder’s liability and the tradeoffs between cost of deploying
privacy solutions and potential costs in case of massive data
breach. After all, building in privacy in the system might not
be cheap, but just cheaper than building in no privacy.
There are a number of insights concerning the proposed
methodology that are worthy to be emphasized:
1. Some privacy threats, in contrast to security, affect DFD
elements pair-wise (or sometimes group-wise). For in-
stance, unlinkability implies the relation of two or more
items of interest. As an example, a relation may refer to
a subject (an entity in the DFD) and its attributes (in the
data stores). Consequently, it is straightforward to see
that linkability threats always affect a pair or a group of
DFD elements. Similarly, plausible deniability refers to
the pair-wise relation between a subject and the attribute
that the subject wants to deny. We can draw a conclusion
that privacy emphasizes relationships between instances
of DFD elements (e.g. two communication instances of
the same data flow cannot be linked) or relationships be-
tween a DFD element and an entity, while security fo-
cuses on each individual DFD component in a more lo-
cal way.
2. The process element in the DFD is less important for
privacy because privacy cares more about the relation-
ships between entities and data. It is quite the opposite
in the case of security. For instance, all STRIDE threat
categories apply to the process element, while, in LIND-
DUN, all privacy attack paths involving the process ele-
ment are related to a security threat (namely, information
disclosure of process) and not to privacy threats per se.
This observation leads to our next finding.
3. The authors have chosen the DFD notation to represent a
software-based system in order to keep compliance with
the STRIDE approach. As STRIDE and LINDDUN are
expected to be applied in a synergic way, this choice
fosters the reuse of the DFD models (and the model-
ing knowledge) across the security and the privacy threat
analysis.
However, it should be noticed that DFD elements (en-
tities, processes, data flows, and data stores) represent
the technical assets that require protection from privacy-
specific harm. That is, the DFDs expose the privacy-
relevant information concerning the technical assets
from the system perspective. Therefore, the privacy an-
alyst should pay attention to the fact that the important
privacy assets are properly modeled by the DFD. For in-
stance, data flows should be specific to IOIs in the pri-
vacy case.
4. For some privacy properties, an extension of the DFD
semantics might be useful. For instance, for the case of
privacy-sensitive information that is inferred over time,
the notion of knowledge is necessary. This could be an-
notated in the DFD processes via epistemic constructs
and then leveraged during the analysis.
5. Concerning the privacy threat trees, one can see that many
paths lead to security threats (e.g. information disclo-
sure and tampering). Consequently, privacy objectives
heavily depend on security objectives (e.g. confidential-
ity and integrity of data flow, data store or process). We
draw the general conclusion that it is interesting to an-
alyze privacy threats together with security threats and
the necessary process (and tool) support should be built
to facilitate such activities. This synergy would bring an
advantage in terms of time and cost for system design-
ers to work with. Further, privacy and security objec-
tives might conflict (e.g. non-repudiation and plausible
deniability, as explained in the previous sections). It is
thus useful to perform the threat analysis for privacy and
security altogether and consider both types of require-
ments at the same time.
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Finally, it is necessary to clarify a few definitions to avoid
confusion. Confidentiality refers to hiding the data content;
anonymity and pseudonymity refer to hiding the subject’s
identity or hiding the link between identity and action or a
piece of information; unlinkability refers to hiding links be-
tween two or more objectives (actions, identities, and pieces
of information); and undetectability and unobservability re-
fers to hiding a subject’s activity. In particular, unlinkability
of entities means that it is impossible to relate different en-
tities based on some common personal identifiable informa-
tion (PII), while anonymity of entities means that the subject
cannot be identified within a anonymity set. Anonymity at
data flow typically means that, in an anonymous communi-
cation setting, the subject cannot be identified from the data
flow’s content or side channel information; while anonym-
ity at data store refers to data anonymization, meaning that
the subject cannot be identified from the content of the data
store.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive frame-
work to model privacy threats in software-based systems,
elicit privacy requirements, and instantiate privacy enhan-
cing countermeasures. The primary contribution is the sys-
tematic methodology to model privacy specific threats. This
is achieved by defining a list of privacy threat types and pro-
viding the necessary mappings to the elements in the system
model. The second contribution is represented by the sup-
porting body of knowledge, namely, an extensive catalogue
of privacy specific threat tree patterns. In addition, this work
provides the means to map the most commonly known pri-
vacy enhancing technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy
threats and the elicited privacy requirements. The privacy
threat tree patterns and categorization of suggested PETs
are expected to be continuously updated and improved upon,
since new threats keep emerging, just as new privacy tech-
nologies keep evolving.
As future work, we plan to apply the proposed frame-
work to larger case studies, for instance, validation in the
context of a national e-health system is being performed.
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A Misuse case examples
MUC 2: Linkability of of the user-portal data stream (data
flow)
Summary: Data flows can be linked to the same person (without neces-
sarily revealing the persons identity)
Asset: PII of the user
– The user:
– data flow can be linked to each other which might reveal the
persons identity
– the attacker can build a profile of a user’s online activities (in-
terests, active time, comments, updates, etc.)
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor intercepts / eavesdrops two or more data flows
2. The misactor can link the data flows to each other and possibly link
them (by combining this information) to the user / data subject
Trigger: by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
– No anonymous communication system used
– Information disclosure of data flow possible
Prevention capture points:
– Use strong anonymous communication techniques
– Provide confidential channel
Prevention guarantee: Impossible to link data to each other
MUC 3: Linkability of the social network users (entity)
Summary: Entities (with different pseudonyms) can be linked to the
same person (without necessarily revealing the persons identity)
Asset: PII of the user
– The user:
– data can be linked to each other which might reveal the per-
sons identity
– attacker can build a profile of a user’s online activities (inter-
ests, actives time, comments, updates, etc.)
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor intercepts or eavesdrops two or more pseudonyms
2. The misactor can link the pseudonyms to each other and possibly
link (by combining this information) to the user / data subject
Trigger: by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
– Information Disclosure of the data flow possible
– Different “pseudonyms” are linked to each other based on content
of the data flow
Prevention capture points:
– protection of information such as user temporary ID, IP address,
time and location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer
ID, communication content, e.g. apply data obfuscation to protec-
tion this information (security)
– message and channel confidentiality provided
Prevention guarantee: Impossible to link data to each other
MUC 4: Identifiability at the social network database (data
store)
Summary: The users identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The data is linked to a pseudonym
3. The misactor can link the pseudonym to the actual identity (iden-
tifiability of entity)
4. The misactor can link the data to the actual user’s identity
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The can link information from the database to other information
(from another database or information which might be publicly
accessible)
3. The misactor can re-identify the user based on the combined in-
formation
Trigger: by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
– no or insufficient protection of the data store
– no data anonymization techniques used
Prevention capture points:
– protection of the data store (security)
– apply data anonymization techniques
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to link data to identity (depend-
ing on applied technique)
MUC 5: Identifiability of user-portal data stream (data flow)
Summary: The users identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor: insider / outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains personal identifiable information about the user
(user relationships, address, etc.)
3. The misactor is able to extract personal identifiable information
from the user / data subject
Trigger: by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
– no or weak anonymous communication system used
– Information disclosure of data flow possible
Prevention capture points:
– apply anonymous communication techniques
– Use confidential channel
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to link data to identity (depend-
ing on applied technique)
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MUC 6: Identifiability of users of the social network system
(entity)
Summary: The users identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains the user’s password
3. The misactor has access to the identity management database
4. The misactor can link the password to the user
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains the user’s password
3. The misactor can link the user’s password to the user’s identity
(password is initials followed by birthdate)
Trigger: by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated and
the user logs in using his “secret”
Preconditions:
– Insecure IDM system OR
– weak passwords used and information disclosure of data flow pos-
sible
Prevention capture points:
– Strong pseudonymity technique used (e.g. strong passwords)
– privacy-enhancing IDM system
– Data flow confidentiality
Prevention guarantee: hard(er) to link log-in to identity.
MUC 7: Information Disclosure at the social network database
(data store)
Summary: Data is exposed to unauthorized users
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed sensitive data
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The misactor retrieves data to which he should not have access
Trigger: by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
– no or insufficient internal access policies
Prevention capture points:
– strong access control policies (security). For example, rule-based
access control based on friendships in the social network
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to obtain data without having
the necessary permissions
MUC 8: Information Disclosure of communication between
the user and the social network (data flow)
Summary: The communication is exposed to unauthorized users
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed sensitive data
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The misactor retrieves data to which he should not have access
Trigger: by misactor, can happen whenever messages are being sent
Preconditions:
– communication goes through insecure public network
Prevention capture points:
– messages sent between user and social network web client is en-
crypted and secure communication channel is ensured
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to gain access to the data flow
without having the right permissions
MUC 9: Content unawareness
Summary: User is unaware that his or her anonymity is at risk due to
the fact that too much personal identifiable information is released
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor: skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gain access to user’s online comments
2. The misactor profiles the user’s data and can identify the user
Trigger: by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
– User provides too much personal data
Prevention capture points:
– User provides only minimal set of required information
Prevention guarantee: user will be informed about potential privacy
risks
MUC 10: Policy and consent noncompliance
Summary: The social network provider doesn’t process user’s personal
data in compliance with user consent, e.g., disclose the database to
third parties for secondary use
Asset: PII of the user
– The user: revealed identity and personal information
– The system / company: negative impact on reputation
Primary misactor: Insider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to social network database
2. The misactor discloses the data to a third party
Trigger: by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
– misactor can tamper with privacy policies and makes consents in-
consistent OR




– Design system in compliance with legal guidelines for privacy and
data protection and keep internal policies consistent with policies
communicated to user
– Legal enforcement: user can sue the social network provider when-
ever his or her personal data is processed without consents
– Employee contracts: employees who share information with 3th
parties will be penalized (fired, pay fine, etc.)
Prevention guarantee: Legal enforcement will lower the threat of an
insider leaking information but it will still be possible to breach user’s
privacy
